Public Notes

Current affairs explainers · Note 043

Gaza one year after the peace plan: ceasefire without reconstruction

World affairs · Reference edition 1 November 2026 · 2 min read

Study context: GS II — India and its neighbourhood — relations; bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements; important international institutions, agencies and fora.

Background explainer from the November 2026 study collection. Events discussed may predate the collection; this is not a monthly news update.

The Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, a twenty-point plan brokered by the United States, came into effect on 10 October 2025, bringing a ceasefire, the release of Israeli captives and Palestinian prisoners, and a promise of reconstruction, humanitarian access, Israeli withdrawal to agreed lines, a transitional Palestinian administration and an International Stabilization Force. One year on, October 2026 assessments describe implementation as largely stalled. The American Friends Service Committee's report card of 13 October 2026 found that Israel had complied in full with only one of the twenty points — the release of 250 Palestinian prisoners and 1,700 detained Palestinians — while the United States had failed to deliver on its commitments, and assessed that Israel had killed at least 1,460 Palestinians in Gaza since the ceasefire began, bringing the total killed to more than 75,000.

Some institutional steps did occur. The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, the technocratic body meant to run Gaza's municipal and public services, was formed in January 2026, and Hamas relinquished control to it on 6 July. A roadmap published in July 2026 set out a phased path to a second phase, including verification by an International Verification Committee, deployment of the International Stabilization Force to separate Israeli forces from committee-controlled areas, and eventual disarmament arrangements under which only the committee would hold weapons. But the committee had not established itself inside Gaza, the force had not deployed as envisaged, and reconstruction had made little meaningful progress, leaving displaced families in temporary shelters and damaged buildings.

Humanitarian access remained far below the plan's own benchmark. The plan envisaged aid returning to previous levels of about 600 trucks a day; Israel was allowing an average of only 217 trucks a day, according to the October 2026 assessment, and the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification projected about 1.4 million Palestinians in Gaza facing hunger through at least December 2026. A 25-billion-dollar economic development and reconstruction plan presented by Jared Kushner at Davos in January 2026 was drawn up without consultation with Palestinians, according to the same assessment, and no action had followed.

The deadlock's core is sequencing. Israel has insisted that complete Hamas disarmament precede rehabilitation of the Strip; Hamas has refused to disarm completely without parallel Israeli steps, including withdrawal. The Board of Peace created to oversee implementation, endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 of 2025, has been criticised for sidelining the Palestinian Authority and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Gaza in 2026 is thus a case study in the gap between signing a plan and implementing one — and in how a ceasefire that stops major offensives can coexist with continued killing, blocked aid and unbuilt homes.

Key takeaways

  • The twenty-point Gaza plan took effect on 10 October 2025; one year on, an October 2026 report card found Israel in full compliance with only one point.
  • A technocratic administration was formed in January 2026 and Hamas handed control to it on 6 July, but it had not established itself inside Gaza and reconstruction barely began.
  • Aid averaged about 217 trucks a day against a plan benchmark of about 600, with about 1.4 million Palestinians projected to face hunger through December 2026.

Why it matters for civil studies

Implementation is where peace plans succeed or fail: institutions, sequencing and verification matter as much as the signed text.

Think it through

When disarmament and withdrawal are each conditioned on the other happening first, who should move first — and who can verify that they did?

From the Public Notes companion study collection. Editorial context and corrections.

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